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Brenda L. Gunn* Defining M~tis People as a People: Moving
Beyond the Indian/Mtis Dichotomy
This article argues that the legal definition that defines Metis people in opposition
to Indian detracts from the goal of recognizing the Metis as a distinct people. The
article argues that we ought to de-couple the definitions of Metis and Indian to
more strongly recognize Metis as a distinct people. This article considers three
intertwined concerns that arise from this dichotomous approach to Metis identity
The first concern is about the "hard line" created in the definition between Indian
and Metis, forcing one to be either Indian or Metis. The second concern is that
changes to the definition of Indian may impact the definition of Metis, making
the two identities contingent and inherently connected. The final related concern
is that defining Metis as "not Indian" leads to the question of how distinct Metis
culture needs to be from Indian culture for recognition. The article argues that we
need to re-centre the definition of Metis on being Metis people based on internal
characteristics (who Metis are) and move away from the legal definition of Metis
being contingent on the legal definition of Indian (who Metis are not).
L'auteure avance que la definition legale utilisee pour decrire les Metis par
rapport aux Indiens n'atteint pas Iobjectif de reconnaitre les Metis comme
peuple distinct. Elle allegue que nous devons dissocier les definitions des
termes Metis et Indien pour reconnaitre sans ambigu'te que les Metis forment
un peuple distinct. Dans I'article, elle examine trois questions liees qui decoulent
de cette approche dichotomique de Iidentite des Metis. La premiere a trait a la
ligne dure entre les definitions des termes Indien et Metis, laquelle oblige les
gens a 6tre Fun ou Iautre, Indien ou Metis. La deuxieme est la possibilite que
des modifications a la definition d'indien aient une incidence sur la definition de
Metis, ce qui ferait en sorte que les deux identites dependraient l'une de Iautre
et seraient intrinsequement liees. Derniere question : si les Metis devaient 6tre
definis comme n'etant pas des Indiens, il faudrait determiner a quel point leur
culture doit differer de la culture indienne pour 6tre reconnue. L'auteure affirme
que nous devons recentrer la definition de Metis a partir du fait que les Metis sont
un peuple en se fondant sur des caracteristiques internes (qui sont les Metis) et
nous eloigner de la definition legale de Metis qui depend de la definition d'indien
(ce que les Metis ne sont pas).
* Metis. Associate Professor, Robson Hall Faculty of Law, University of Manitoba. This research
was undertaken with support of the Legal Research Institute, Manitoba. I also thank Rhea Majewski
for her research assistance in the early stages of the project.
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Introduction
Throughout most of the twentieth century, M~tis people were invisible to
and ignored by the Canadian state. There was a general lack of recognition
of M~tis people. Many difficulties arose from this invisibility. The current
legal definition of M~tis continues to be affected by this history of
government regulation of both Indian and M~tis as definitions are often
affected by "culture, politics, and the particularities of communities'
histories."1 In the legal realm, what developed was a definition of M~tis
as not (or distinct from) Indian, and that definition developed, in part, to
recognize M~tis people as distinct Aboriginal people, not derived from (or
part) Indian. This article argues that defining M~tis in opposition to Indian
actually detracts from the goal of recognizing M~tis as a distinct people
because it causes the two people to remain dependent and contingent upon
one another.
This article contributes to the already existing literature on defining
indigeneity, and defining M~tis in particular. More specifically, it contributes
to the larger body of work asserting the recognition and definition of M~tis
1. Joyce Green, "The Complexity of Indigenous Identity Formation and Politics in Canada: Self-
Determination and Decolonizatiof' (2009) 2:2 Intl J Critical Indigenous Studies 36 at 37, online:
IJCIS <www.isrqut.edu.au/pdf/ijcis/v2n2 2009/Final Greerapdf> [Green, "Indigenous Identity
Formation"].
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as a distinct people.' A vast body of scholarship discusses definitions of
Mtis, including in the fields of history, Aboriginal studies, anthropology,
law, and sociology which debate who the Mtis recognized in section 35
are, or distinctions between "Mtis" and "metis," the origins of the Mtis
people, and the geographical extent of Mtis people.3 There is a similarly
large volume of literature discussing the legal regulation of Indians and
the problems associated with the government definitions, including the
loss of status when women martied non-status men.4 This article does not
recanvass the issues that have already been considered, instead focusing
on the problem of the legal definition that defines M6tis in relation or
opposition to Indian. This article argues that the legal definition, which
2. For example, see: Paul LAH Chartrand & John Giokas, "Defining 'The Metis People': The
Hard Case of Canadian Aboriginal Law" in Paul LAH Chartrand, ed, Who Are Canada sAboriginal
Peoples? Recognition, Definition, and Jurisdiction (Saskatoon: Purich, 2002) 268; Chris Andersen,
Metis: Race, Recognition, and the Struggle for Indigenous Peoplehood (Vancouver: UBC Press,
2014) [Andersen, Strugglefor Peoplehood]; Darren O'Toole, "From Entity to Identity to Nation: The
Ethnogenesis of the Wiisakodewininiwag (Bois-Barule) Reconsidered" in Christopher Adams, Gregg
Dahl & Ian Peach, eds, Metis in Canada: History, Identity, Law and Politics (Edmonton: University of
Alberta Press, 2013) 143.
3. For example, see Catherine Bell, "Who Are the Metis People in Section 35(2)?" (1991) 29:2 Alta
L Rev 351; Jacqueline Peterson & Jennifer SB Brown, eds, The New Peoples: Being and Becoming
Mtis in North America (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1985); Brenda MacDougall, One
of the Family: Metis Culture in Nineteenth-Century Northwestern Saskatchewan (Vancouver: UBC
Press, 2010); JE Foster, "The Metis: The People and the Term" (1978) 3:1 Prairie Forum 79; Joe
Sawchuk, "Negotiating an Identity: Metis Political Organizations, the Canadian Government, and
Competing Concepts of Aboriginality" (2001) 25:1 American Indian Q 73; Larry N Chartrand, "The
Definition of Metis Peoples in Section 35(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982" (2004) 67:1 Sask L Rev
209; Jean Barman & Mike Evans, "Reflections on Being, and Becoming, Metis in British Columbia"
(2009) 161 BC Studies 59; Adams, Dah & Peach, supra note 2; Darcy Belisle, "Finding Home on
the Way: Naming the Metis" (2006) 31:1 Prairie Forum 105; Chris Andersen, "'I'm Metis, What's
your Excuse?': On the Optics and the Ethics of the Misrecognition of Metis in Canada" (2011) 1:2
Aboriginal Policy Studies 161; Joyce Green, "Don't Tell Us Who We Are (Not): Reflections on Metis
Identity" (2011) 1:2 Aboriginal Policy Studies 166 [Green, "Reflections on Metis Identity"]; and John
Giokas & Paul LAH Chartrand, "Who Are the Metis in Section 35? A Review of the Law and Policy
Relating to Metis and 'Mixed-Blood' People in Canada" in P Chartrand, supra note 2, 83.
4. See for example Bonita Lawrence, "Real" Indians and Others: Mixed-Blood Urban Native
Peoples and Indigenous Nationhood (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004); Robert K Groves, "The Curious
Instance of the Irregular Band: A Case Study of Canada's Missing Recognition Policy" (2007) 70:1
Sask L Rev 153; John Giokas & Robert K Groves, "Collective and Individual Recognition in Canada:
The Indian Act Regime" in P Chartrand, supra note 2, 41; Sarah E Hamill, "Mclvor v Canada and
the 2010 Amendments to the Indian Act: A Half-Hearted Remedy to Historical Injustice" (2011) 19:2
Const Forum Const 75; Val Napoleon, "Extinction by Number: Colonialism Made Easy" (2001)
16:1 CJLS 113; Sharon Donna McIvor, "Aboriginal Women Unmasked: Using Equality Litigation
to Advance Women's Rights" (2004) 16:1 CJWL 106; Kiera L Ladner, "Gendering Decolonisation,
Decolonising Gender" (2009) 13:1 Australian Indigenous L Rev 62; Joyce Green, "Constitutionalising
the Patriarchy: Aboriginal Women and Aboriginal Government" (1993) 4:4 Const Forum Const 110;
Canada, Advisory Council on the Status of Women, Indian Women and the Law in Canada: Citizens
Minus, by Kathleen Jamieson (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1978); Janet Silman, ed, Enough
is Enough: Aboriginal Women Speak Out (Toronto: Women's Press, 1987); and Mary Eberts, "Still
Colonizing After All These Years" (2013) 64 UNBLJ 123.
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has been taken up by various Mdtis organizations to define Mdtis people in
opposition to Indian people, actually detracts from the goal of recognizing
Mdtis as a distinct people. We ought to de-couple the definitions of Mdtis
and Indian to more strongly recognize Mdtis as a distinct people. Mdtis
should be defined by who we are, rather than who we are not.
While some might argue that definitions and identity are always
relational, the concern examined in this article is the particular use of
defining Mdtis as "not Indian" because it continues to invoke definitions
set by Canadian governments. These definitions of Indian and Mdtis are
troubling because they ground definitions in biology and culture, not
factors internal to the Mdtis people. The article argues that we need to
re-centre the definition of Mdtis on being Mdtis people based on internal
characteristics (who Mdtis are) and move away from the legal definition
of Metis being contingent on the legal definition of Indian (who Mdtis are
not). To illustrate the concern with the Indian/Mdtis dichotomy by way of
analogy, one would not think to define Mdtis as not Italian because there
is no connection between them. By reiterating that Mdtis are not Indian,
the two peoples remain interdependent because it suggests a relevance
and connection between Indian and Mdtis and therefore undermines the
independence of the Mdtis people.
This article considers three intertwined concerns that arise from this
dichotomous approach to Mdtis identity. The first concern is about the "hard
line" created in the definition between Indian and Mdtis, forcing one to be
either Indian or Mdtis, a problem that arose in Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs
and Northern Development) v Cunningham.' This article argues that any
definition of Mdtis should emphasize who Mdtis people are, rather than
who they are not. The second concern regarding the use of the dichotomy
is that changes to the definition of Indian may impact the definition of
Mdtis, making the two identities contingent and inherently connected.
Further, if Mdtis and Indian are dichotomous, and Indian is defined
based on biology, then the other half of the dichotomy must necessarily
be similarly biologically defined. This is particularly problematic as the
federal government continuously redefines "Indian." An oppositional
definition can also reinforce biological definitions of Mdtis that highlight
Mdtis as "half-breeds." The final related concern is that defining Mdtis as
"not Indian" leads to the question of how distinct Mdtis culture needs to
be from Indian culture for recognition. This oppositional approach leads
to culturally-based definitions and inquiries into distinctions between the
5. Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development) v Cunningham, 2011 SCC 37, [2011] 2
SCR 670 [Cunningham].
Defining M6tis People as a People: Moving 417
Beyond the Indian/M6tis Dichotomy
cultures; similarities may undermine M~tis uniqueness. If M~tis identity
continues to be connected (through an oppositional definition) with
Indian, it also keeps the two intertwined, and detracts from recognition of
M~tis as independent people. Shifting away from the dichotomy (which
engages biological and cultural definitions) toward a political definition of
M~tis connotes that M~tis people are "to be negotiated with collectively to
redistribute political power."6
While this article argues that caution must be exercised when defining
boundaries between Indian and M~tis which are dichotomous, I recognize
that defining who is M~tis and who is Indian (or broader questions of
defining Aboiginality) may be necessary to determine eligibility for
various Canadian government sponsored benefits and other programs.
7
Entitlement for either program may in fact limit access, so that one can
only access "Mtis" or "Indian" rights. However, the question of eligibility
for government sponsored benefits should be a different question than who
is M~tis and who is Indian, particularly because M~tis and Indians are
regulated differently in Canadian law and have unique rights recognized
in the Constitution.'
This article begins with an overview of Cunningham to exemplify
many of the concerns with the legal definition of M6tis. Next, it discusses
the ways in which M6tis identity and Indian identity have been regulated
by the Canadian state, including legislatures and courts. This article
engages a theoretical framework that problematizes the use of binaries
in determining identity, including grounding legal definitions simply in
biology or in culture. This discussion demonstrates that the dichotomous
approach to defining M6tis was created by law and is not reflective of
historical, cultural or biological differences between Indian and M6tis. In
fact, there has also been movement between the two categories. Then it
considers how the Canadian definitions seem to be internalized by M6tis
organizations. Finally, the article proposes that the legal definition of M6tis
should not be determined in opposition to Indian, but argues that the legal
definition of M6tis should focus on their peoplehood-political entities
whose citizens demonstrate loyalty (and not just biological or cultural
connections). The article draws on general principles of international
human rights law which provide protections for individuals against
6. Darren O'Toole, The Red River Resistance of 1869 1870: The Machiavellian Moment of
the Metis of Manitoba (PhD Thesis, University of Ottawa Department of Political Science, 2010)
[unpublished] at 31 [emphasis removed].
7. Pamela D Palmater, Beyond Blood: Rethinking Indigenous Identity (Saskatoon: Puich, 2011) at
138.
8. Constitution Act, 1982, s 35(1), being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
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government (including Indigenous government) actions while maintaining
Indigenous peoples' ight to self-define.
I. Overview of Cunningham
In the recent Cunningham case, the Supreme Court of Canada considered
the membership provisions of the Alberta Mdtis Settlements as set out
in the Mtis Settlement Act (MSA), and upheld the provisions revoking
settlement membership if status is obtained under the Indian Act.9 This
decision highlights the Court's dichotomous approach to defining Mdtis as
not Indian when it held that one cannot simultaneously be a Mdtis under
the MSA and an Indian under the Indian Act. While Cunningham arose
in the particular context of the definition of M~tis under the MSA, the
Court's analysis demonstrates how Indian and Mtis are thought to be
dichotomous in Canadian law. This section provides a brief overview of
Cunningham, and the details and outcome of the case demonstrate the
need to rethink the definition of Mtis. The critique below is not directed
at the section 15 Charter analysis, but focuses instead on how the Court
defined M~tis people and the consequences for membership.
In this case, the Cunningham family were long-standing and active
members of the Peavine Mtis settlement, who obtained status under the
Indian Act to access medical benefits when Bill C-31 changed eligibility
requirements.1" The MSA precludes settlement members from voluntary
registration under the Indian Act." When members of the Cunningham
family gained status under the Indian Act, the settlement revoked
their membership under the MSA.12 However, other members of the
settlement who gained status were allowed to keep their membership;
only the Cunningham family had theirs revoked.3 As a consequence,
the Cunningham family may have been able to continue residing on the
settlement, but "they would have no say in settlement governance or the
right to vote." 4 In response, members of the Cunningham family sought
to have the provisions revoking their membership declared contrary
to section 15 of the Charter. One concern with the MSA membership
provision refusing dual registration was that there was no evidence that
the Cunningham family's cultural or political allegiance or connection to
the settlement had changed.
9. Cunningham, supra note 5; Metis Settlements Act, RSA 2000, c M-14 [MSI]; Indian Act, RSC
1985, c 1-5.
10. Cunningham, supra note 5.
11. MSA, supra note 9, s 90.
12. Cunningham, supra note 5 at para 25.
13. Ibid at para 26.
14. Ibid at para 27.
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The MSA defines Mtis as "a person of aboriginal ancestry who
identifies with Metis history and culture."15 However, in considering
Mtis identity, the Supreme Court's analysis emphasizes a distinction
between Indian and Mtis. The Court determined that the "object of the
MSA program is... establishing a Mtis land base to preserve and enhance
Mtis identity, culture and self-governance, as distinct from surrounding
Indian cultures and from other cultures in the province."" To achieve this
object, "the legislature has excluded Mtis who are also status Indians
from membership in the settlement for purposes of establishing a Mtis
land base."" Highlighting the distinction between Indian and Mtis led
the Court to conclude "the exclusion from membership in any Mtis
settlement... of Mtis who are also status Indians.. corresponds to
the historic and social distinction between the Mtis and Indians... and
respects the role of the Mtis in defining themselves as a people."" While
the decision is grounded in specific legislation, it engages the dichotomy
that one can only be Indian or Mtis. The Court did not explain why
recognizing the historical distinction between Indian and Mtis requires a
mutually exclusive definition. The Court simply held that to protect Mtis
people, one must be either Indian or Mtis. Even though this decision
was specifically analyzing a statute, underlying it is a presupposition that
one cannot be both "Indian" and "Mdtis"-that the two categories are
dichotomous.
In their pleadings, "[t]he claimants argue that people-particularly
Aboriginal people-may, for historical reasons, have multiple identities
and that the law should respect those identities in all their complexity."9
However, the Court rejected this argument because "[i]n order to preserve
the unique Mtis culture and identity and to assure effective self-
governance through a dedicated Mtis land base, some line drawing will
be required."'" While the sentiment that boundaries may need to be drawn
to promote and recognize the distinction between Indian and Mtis has a
certain air of truth, the approach of relying on a dichotomous definition
between Indian and M16tis fails to actually recognize the independence of
the two peoples. In this decision the Court appears to believe that Indians
are a threat to Mtis people-that Indians may undermine or overtake
them. However, if the concern relates to the invisibility or lack of accepted
15. MSA, supra note 9, s 1(j).
16. Cunningham, supra note 5 at para 62.
17. Ibid at para 72.
18. Ibid at para 83.
19. Ibid at para 85.
20. Ibid at para 86.
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definition of Mtis, creating an oppositional definition of Indian and Mtis
does not actually protect Mtis as a distinct people precisely because it
reiterates the connection and interdependency between the two. This paper
argues that the definition of Mtis needs to move away from a simple "not
Indian" to focus on internal factors defining Mtis as "a people," relying
less on external factors such as non-Indianness as defined by the Canadian
state.
Cunningham highlights the many issues that follow from the
dichotomous approach to defining Indian and Mtis. Setting a hard
line between Indian and Mtis creates an artificial distinction that, for
many, would force people to choose an identity even when one could
potentially have one Indian and one Mtis parent, and have biological,
cultural and political allegiance to both. This case demonstrated another
problem: definitions based on dichotomies mean that if one side changes
(for example, the legal definition of Indian) it affects the definition of
the other side. This interdependent approach detracts from the desire
of Mtis to be recognized as an independent people if the definition of
Mtis is continuously reliant on the definition of Indian. This dichotomous
approach is particularly problematic because the Canadian state has long
regulated "Indians" based on biological factors, such as blood quantum.
While one solution might suggest that Mtis people need to define
themselves, Mtis people were involved in negotiating the MSA, including
the provision prohibiting members from gaining Indian status. Thus, a
concern remains regarding the way in which Mtis people themselves
have taken up the dichotomous approach to defining themselves, in part to
reassert heir distinction as a unique Aboriginal people in Canada. Relying
on the dichotomous approach has caused some Mtis communities and
organizations to limit the right of members to identify and be recognized
as both Mtis and Indian.
21
To better understand the problem created by a definition of Mtis
as dichotomous with Indian, the next section explains the problematic
approaches Canada has used to regulate Indian and Mtis. These
approaches are problematic because they focus on biological and cultural
definitions, not on political definitions of a people.
21. Anecdotes are arising that the Manitoba Metis Federation is relying on Cunningham to
remove people from the MMF membership list if they are registered as Indians under the Indian Act
(Sharon Parenteau, Presentation delivered during Indigenous Awareness Week: Treaties, Traditional
Knowledge, and Elders at the University of Manitoba, 19 March 2015 [unpublished]).
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II. Historical definition and regulation of Indian and Mtis
The Canadian government has long forced people to fit into specific silos of
Indian, Inuit or Mtis.22 The narrative that Indians got treaty and Mtis got
scrip is discussed here because it is often invoked today to support modern
dichotomous definitions of Indian and Mtis. This section highlights some
key legislative and regulatory regimes the Canadian government has
developed to regulate Indian and Mtis. The overview will focus on three
regimes: treaty negotiations, scrip process, and the development of the
Indian status provisions of the Indian Act. The aim is not to retell this
already well-documented history, but rather to destabilize the normalized
idea that Canadian regulation has always drawn a clear oppositional line
between Indian and Mtis. At a general policy level, the narrative that
Indians got treaty and Mtis got scrip is accurate; in practice, it was not
this simple. In fact, there were many exceptions and much fluidity between
the categories.
By highlighting the regulation of Indian and Mtis, this section
demonstrates how Canadian law created the dichotomy of either Indian
or Mtis in part for administrative ease and to reduce people from
accessing both "benefits" of treaty and scrip. Grounding my critique of
the dichotomy in this complicated history lends supports to the argument
that continued reliance on a definition of Mtis grounded in the dichotomy
between Indian and Mtis detracts from Mtis people's attempts to gain
recognition as a distinct people. When Mtis people rely on the dichotomy,
it can lend legitimacy to the government-imposed definitions created for
administrative ease (which in part rely on imposed ideas of culture and
race), rather than shifting the focus to internal conditions leading to the
creation of the distinct Mtis people.
The Canadian state has long been engaged in the process of defining
Indian and Mtis, which is problematic because "the nation-state often
creates or defines aboriginal identities for its own use" and motivations.23
Identity definitions are often relational and are formed in binary opposition.
A major critique of identity definitions through binaries is the way in
which structural power is reinforced and definitions are created by external
forces. As the feminist philosopher Simone de Beauvoir once explained,
no group ever sets itself up as the One without at once setting up the
Other over against itself .... [I]t is not the Other who, in defining himself
as the Other, establishes the One. The Other is posed as such by the One
22. Andersen, Struggle for Peoplehood, supra note 2 at 16.
23. Sawchuk, supra note 3 at 73.
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in defining himself as the One."24 The problem highlighted here is the
lack of self-definition: the group being defined as not-something, rather
than being defined as something. In the case of Mdtis, the dichotomous
approach is more problematic because it is the settler state that defines
who is Indian and thus continues to control the definition of Mdtis.
Joe Sawchuk discusses a similar difficulty in identity discussions for
Aboriginal people: "[t]he very process of declaring oneself to be 'Mdtis'
(or 'Indian' or 'Inuit') means taking on aspects of identity and otherness
that have been defined by the dominant society."25 The use of this binary
approach to defining Mdtis and Indian also means that one can only be
Mdtis or Indian; there is no room to be both.
The need to identify as Indian or Mdtis was not necessary until such a
distinction was "fostered by governments, census takers, employers, and
others"26 with the creation of the treaty and scrip regimes. Government
policy was "that the 'half-breed' scrip claimants were intentionally
excluded from benefits received by Indian peoples pursuant to the Indian
Act."2 While Crown policy dictated that scrip was for Mdtis and treaty
was for Indians, the process of identifying who was Mdtis and who was
Indian for the purposes of scrip and treaty was not straightforward. In
1880, Alexander Morris indicated that there were essentially three different
types of half-breeds: those with "farms and homes; ... those who are
entirely identified with the Indians, living with them, and speaking their
language; ... those who do not farm, but live after the habits of the Indians,
by the pursuit of the buffalo and the chase."2 Different legal consequences
were proposed for these different groups.29 Morris suggested that the first
group should be recognized as possessors of the soil to continue making
their living by farming and trading; the second group was just to be
recognized as Indians and brought within existing bands.3" At this time,
Morris recommended that the third group of half-breeds, the Mdtis, should
be brought under treaties.31 In his proposals, Morris started with a basic
biological approach (Mdtis as half-breeds), but then considered cultural
24. Simone de Beauvoir, "'Introduction' to The Second Sex" in Linda Nicholson, ed, The Second
Wave: A Reader in Feminist Theory (New York: Routledge, 1997) 11 at 14.
25. Sawchuk, supra note 3 at 73.
26. Jennifer SH Brown, "Cores and Boundaries: Metis Historiography Across a Generation" (2008)
17:2 Native Studies Rev 1 at 11.
27. Bell, supra note 3 at 377.
28. Alexander Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the North-West
Territories Including the Negotiations on which They Were Based, and Other Information Relating
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and economic factors to determine the appropriate l gal regime. However,
he recommended that the Mdtis get treaty, not scrip.
Mdtis and Indian communities often lived side by side and shared
similar lifestyles until they were forced to access different funding and
were, as a result, forced to diverge.32 Joe Sawchuk notes that even after
the treaty and scrip regimes were initiated "the status of Mdtis and Indian
was often interchangeable."33 At various points, people moved from one
category to the other; thus the categories were related and relative, not
oppositional.
Even the government background research reports on the treaties
show the complications in the application of the treaty and scrip regimes.
In many instances, the decision to grant scrip or treaty was decided on a
case-by-case basis, as in the case of Treaty 3 and later treaties.34 Treaty
3 provides the most oft-cited example of half-breeds (Mdtis) adhering to
treaty.
During negotiations of Treaty 8, Mdtis began distinguishing between
themselves and the Indians. Half-breeds that the treaty commissioners
deemed to be living "the Indian mode of life" were extended the option to
take treaty, but began to demand scrip instead-refusing to be associated
with the "stigma of inferiority" arising from the Indian Act, 1876.3" In
Treaty 11, the commissioners noted the distinction between Indian and
Mdtis, but it was often a "matter of choice" or "of chance."36 Many Treaty
Indians were biologically of "mixed racial heritage" and could also be
"culturally identical to many Metis."37 The history of scrip indicates that
many were forced to take it either because of financial strain or because
they were convinced of its benefits without actually understanding its
repercussions.38 These examples indicate that the dichotomy of Indian or
Mdtis identity is connected to the Canadian government's desire to place
people under one regime or another.
32. Brown, supra note 26 at 5-6.
33. Sawchuk, supra note 3 at 74.
34. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Treaty Research Report: Treaty Three, by Wayne E
Daugherty (Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1986), online: Aboriginal Affairs and
Northern Development Canada <www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/ 1100100028671>.
35. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Treaty Research Report: Treaty Eight (1899), by Dennis
FK Madill, (Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1986) at 30, online: Aboriginal Affairs
and Northern Development Canada <www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/l 100100028805>; Indian Act, SC
1876, c 18 [Indian Act, 1876].
36. Indian and NorthernAffairs Canada, TreatyResearch Report: Treaty No. 1] (1921),by Kenneth S
Coates & William R Morrison (Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1986), online: Aboriginal
Affairs and Northern Development Canada <www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100028912>.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
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There are also examples of people taking treaty, but then opting to take
scrip, demonstrating the fluidity between these categories. For example,
Papaschase Indian Band (Descendants oJ) v Canada (Attorney General)
was about a band that adhered to Treaty 6 in August 1877.39 Then in 1886,
members of the band withdrew from the Treaty and took scrip.40 After
the Papaschase withdrew from the Treaty, the Indian Act was amended to
require the Indian Commissioner's consent to withdraw.41
These examples highlight that sometimes the line between Indian and
Mtis was imposed for administrative reasons and there was fluidity and
movement between the legal categories. The dichotomy does not represent
internal understandings or self-definition of Mtis people. In this way, it
is too simple to say Mtis got scrip and Indians got treaty, so people must
always be either Indian or Mtis. A more peoples-based approach would
emphasize that Mtis people exercised their political power to engage in
negotiations with the Canadian state, which led to creating a scrip system.
Relying on the dichotomy becomes even more problematic because of the
shifting legal definition of "Indian" under the Indian Act.
Britain took steps to legislatively define "Indian" as early as 1850,42
and Canada continues to do so today under the Indian Act.43 In contrast,
Parliament has never legislated a definition of Mtis. 44 The Indian Act
created a definition of "Indian," which from the beginning focused on
patrilineal descent: "[a]ny male person of Indian blood reputed to belong
to a particular band... [a]ny child of such person... [and] [a]ny woman
who is or was lawfully married to such person.145 From the beginning,
the Indian Act definition was grounded in biological definitions of Indian.
The focus on blood quantum in the definition of Indian may force the
definition of Mtis to be similarly grounded in biology if the two continue
to be defined as oppositional.
Joyce Green argues that the definition of Indian under the Indian Act
aimed to limit financial and political liability of the colonial state and
did not reflect political entities, or biological or cultural distinctions.46 In
39. Papaschase Indian Band (Descendants of) v Canada (AG), 2004 ABQB 655 at para 12, [2005]
8 WWR 442.
40. Ibid at para 23.
41. An Actfurther to amend "The IndianAct, " SC 1888, c 22, s 1.
42. An Act for the better protection of the Lands and Property of the Indians in Lower Canada, S
Prov C 1850 (13 & 14 Vict), c 42.
43. The IndianAct was first enacted in 1876 (IndianAct, 1876, supra note 35) and continues in force
(Indian Act, supra note 9).
44. Sawchuk, supra note 3 at 75.
45. IndianAct, 1876, supra note 35, s 3(3).
46. Green, "Reflections on Metis Identity," supra note 3 at 166.
Defining M6tis People as a People: Moving 425
Beyond the Indian/M6tis Dichotomy
addition to taking a biological approach to defining Indian, early definitions
explicitly excluded people who took scrip from obtaining status under the
Indian Act:
No half-breed in Manitoba who has shared in the distribution of half-
breed lands shall be accounted an Indian; and no half-breed head of a
family, except the widow of an Indian, or a half-breed who has already
been admitted into a treaty, shall, unless undervery special circumstances,
which shall be determined by the Superintendent General or his agent,
be accounted an Indian, or entitled to be admitted into any Indian treaty;
and any half-breed who has been admitted into a treaty shall be allowed
to withdraw therefrom on signifying in writing his desire so to do,-
which signification in writing shall be signed by him in the presence of
two witnesses, who shall certify the same on oath before some person
authorized by law to administer the same."
Early on in the process of setting legal definitions for Indian and Mtis,
the government invoked an either-or approach by prohibiting anyone who
took scrip from registering as an Indian.
Despite several amendments to the status provisions of the Indian
Act, it continues to use a biological approach to defining Indian, based
on paternal lineage. The 1951 amendments made the status provisions
stricter, introducing the "double mother" rule, which held that "a child lost
Indian status at age 21 if his or her mother and grandmother had obtained
their own status only through marriage" to a man with Indian status.48 The
amendments also strengthened the marrying-out provisions: "an Indian
woman who married out would not only lose Indian status, she could also
be enfranchised against her will as of the date of her marriage.' 9 The
marrying-out provisions did not apply to Indian men." These amendments
to the Indian Act limited the people whom the government could legally
recognize as Indians. As Mtis are defined in opposition to Indian, when
the government changes who is legally an Indian, it affects who can legally
be recognized as Mtis. Using the dichotomous approach to defining Mtis
makes the definition of Mtis susceptible to the Canadian government's
power to change the definition. Forcing the definition of Mtis to rely on
the definition of Indian only weakens the ability of Mtis to determine
their own identity.
47. IndianAct, RSC 1886, c 43, s 13(1) [emphasis added].
48. Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: Looking Forward, Looking Back, vol 1
(Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1996) at 312 [RCAP Report], citing Indian Act, SC 1951, c 29,
s 12(1)(a)(iv) [IndianAct, 1951].
49. Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: Perspectives and Realities, vol 4
(Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1996) at 30, citing Indian Act, 1951, supra note 48, s 12(1)(b).
50. RCAP Report, vol 4, supra note 49 at 31, citing Indian Act, 1951, supra note 48, s 12(1)(b).
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The loss of status created many hardships for women and their
children. They could no longer stay in their community, hold property
on reserve, or receive a buy-out of treaty money (twenty years) plus a
share of the band's capital held in trust.1 Without status, Indian women
were no longer eligible for social services that may be offered to band
members. As "Mdtis" was not legally defined, many non-status women
and their children joined Mdtis organizations. Some organizations were
specifically Mdtis and non-status organizations. The changing definition
of Indian, based on biology, has affected who may subsequently define
as Mdtis. Defining Mdtis in opposition to Indian can also suggest that
Mdtis are "half-breeds" by placing them in contrast to Indian (full blood).
Or perhaps, as Chris Andersen suggests, it risks making "Mdtis" mean
"Indigenous-but-not-First-Nation-or-Inuit."5 2
Parliament has amended the legal definition of "Indian" several times,
and this continues to impact definitions of Mdtis. In 1982, Parliament
amended the Indian Act again, changing the status provisions. Bill C-31
removed the "marrying-out" provisions, reinstated women who had
lost their status through these provisions and extended status to their
children.3 The result of Bill C-31 was that many families who had begun
to think of themselves as Mdtis could now register as Indian. One problem
with defining Mdtis in opposition to Indian is that the definition of Mdtis
can change if and when the definition of Indian changes. This was the
situation in Cunningham. Bonita Lawrence argues that the Indian Act
created arbitrary distinctions that forced many "half-breeds" to claim they
were Metis because they could no longer merge back into their original
communities.4 She states that the term "Mdtis" would have belonged only
to the Red River Valley Mixed-Bloods if not for the Indian Act, which
externalized so many others from their communities.5 A further concern
is that the Canadian government has used a blood quantum approach
to determine who is Indian. Many communities have internalized this
approach and continue to use it in defining their own membership.6
While this brief overview of government regulation of Indian and Mdtis
demonstrates the interconnectedness of Indian and Mdtis regulation, the
next section reviews in more detail the legal definition of Mdtis.
51. IndianAct, 1951, supra note 48, s 15(1).
52. Andersen, Struggle for Peoplehood, supra note 2 at 24.
53. Bill C-31, An Act to amend the Indian Act, 1st Sess, 33rd Part, 1985, ci7 (assented to 28 April
1985), RSC 1985, c 1-5.
54. Lawrence, supra note 4 at 84.
55. Ibid.
56. Palmater, supra note 7 at 220.
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111. Legal definitions ofM~tis
Other than Alberta's Mtis Settlement Act, there is no statutory definition
of Mtis. Without such a definition, Canadian courts have taken an active
role in creating a legal definition of Mtis. In recent years, Canadian courts
have had several opportunities to define who is Mtis. These opportunities
have arisen in part due to the inclusion of "Mtis" within the definition
of Aboriginal people in section 35(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982.7 In
search of a legal definition of Mtis, the courts have most recently said that
Mtis are not just "part Indian." Rather, courts define Mtis emphatically
as not Indian or as distinct from Indians.
This section reviews the Supreme Court of Canada's decisions defining
Mtis to demonstrate the Court's role in perpetuating the dichotomy
between Mtis and Indian. By focusing on this distinction, the Court
connects the definition of Mtis to the biological definition of Indian used
by the Canadian government and emphasizes cultural differences between
the two peoples. These approaches are problematic because they undermine
recognition of Mtis as a people-a complex and evolving political entity.
The Court's definitions also highlight additional questions related to
who oversees, adjudicates and enforces legal identities, reinforcing the
importance of Mtis people self-defining their citizenship or membership.
When determining a legal definition of Mtis, the Supreme Court used
as a starting point the Royal Commission on Aboriginal People (RCAP)
description of the origins of Mtis:
Intermarriage between First Nations and Inuit women and European
fur traders and fishermen produced children, but the birth of new
Aboriginal cultures took longer. At first, the children of mixed unions
were brought up in the traditions of their mothers or (less often) their
fathers. Gradually, however, distinct Mtis cultures emerged, combining
European and First Nations or Inuit heritages in unique ways. Economics
played a major role in this process. The special qualities and skills of
the Mtis population made them indispensable members of Aboriginal/
non-Aboriginal economic partnerships, and that association contributed
to the shaping of their cultures.
58
This explanation highlights the "ethnogenesis" of M6tis, a new people
emerging from their First Nations and European roots. The Supreme Court
continues to define M6tis people, quoting the RCAP report: "the M6tis
developed separate and istinct identities, not reducible to the mere fact
57. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 8, s 35(2).
58. RCAP Report, vol 4, supra note 49 at 199, cited inR v Powley, 2003 SCC 43 at para 10, [2003]
2 SCR 207 [Powley].
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of their mixed ancestry: '[w]hat distinguishes Mdtis people from everyone
else is that they associate themselves with a culture that is distinctly
Mdtis."' 59 This definition recognizes that Mdtis are an Aboriginal people
with their own inherent Mdtis rights, culture, political structures and
economic systems. They are not just "half Indian." The RCAP definition
attempts to shift consciousness from notions of Mdtis as "half-breeds" or
"mixed-bloods" to Mdtis as a distinct people. The courts engage the RCAP
definition when setting a legal definition of Mdtis people.
R v Powley was the first case of Mdtis rights under section 35(1)
to be heard by the Supreme Court of Canada.6" There were two main
aspects to the Powley decision: first, it defined the Mdtis whose rights are
protected by section 35(1); second, it modified the Van der Peet test for
proving Aboriginal rights to accommodate the Mdtis reality.61 While these
are separate issues, the scope of Mdtis rights and how they are defined
indicates how the courts understand who the Mdtis are.
In Powley, the Supreme Court of Canada began its decision by citing
the above description and definition from the RCAP.62 Building on the
idea that Mdtis are not simply "half-breeds," the Court explained that
"[t]he term 'Mdtis' in s. 35 does not encompass all individuals with mixed
Indian and European heritage; rather, it refers to distinctive peoples who,
in addition to their mixed ancestry, developed their own customs, way of
life, and recognizable group identity separate from their Indian or Inuit and
European forebears."63 Andersen criticizes Powley because "[t]o continue
to understand the Mdtis in terms of some apparently innate mixedness
... emphasizes narrowly construed strands of pre- or early-contact origins
rooted in biology rather than more formal political relationships (such
as treaties), and it reduces the complexity of that indigeneity to these
biologically based origins."64 The Court's first definition of Mdtis under
section 35(2) does highlight that Mdtis people are separate from Indian
ancestors. However, in attempting to emphasize Mdtis as distinct, they
juxtapose Mdtis against First Nations, highlighting who Mdtis people are
not instead of focusing on who Mdtis people are. Based on this definition
of Mdtis people, the Court then set out the legal test to determine Mdtis
people: "self-identification, ancestral connection, and community
59. Powley, supra note 58 at para 10, quoting RCAP Report, vol 4, supra note 49 at 202.
60. Powley, supra note 58.
61. Ibid at para 16; R v Van derPeet, [1996] 2 SCR 507, 137 DLR (4th) 289.
62. Powley, supra note 58 at para 10.
63. Ibid.
64. Andersen, Struggle for Peoplehood, supra note 2 at 11.
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acceptance."" Andersen criticizes this test for failing to ground it in the
"political self-consciousness and attachment to the Mdtis people."66
This definition of Mdtis has been regarded as a significant step
because it recognized that Mdtis are a distinct people, not simply a mix
of Europeans and Indians.6" This shift is significant because previous
courts, when identifying Mdtis rights, used a derivative rights approach
(a biological approach emphasizing genealogical descent from an Indian).
This approach focused on "the extent to which Mdtis claimants were
like First Nations people (or 'followed an Indian mode of life').168 The
protection of Mdtis rights depended on a flawed understanding of Mdtis
people. It is this derivative approach that Mdtis people and subsequent
courts are pushing back against when trying to articulate a distinction
between Mdtis and Indians. The derivative rights approach which failed to
recognize Mdtis as a distinct people is problematic because "Mdtis were
treated as 'less Aboriginal' than First Nations people" and because it failed
to recognize that Mdtis people are a unique Aboriginal people in Canada,
whose rights do not depend on tracing roots back to Indian ancestors.
69
Powley is seen as a positive step because the definition moves away from
a biological definition of Mdtis as half-Indian, to recognize Mdtis as a
distinct people.
Yet the legal definition of Mdtis has been set in part through a binary
opposition with Indian, which means "the internal characteristics of the
person thus identified are not denoted so much as the external context
within which that person is situated.""0 This external binary opposition
approach to defining Mdtis is particularly problematic because identity is
then "relative to a constantly shifting context, to a situation that includes a
network of elements involving others, the objective economic onditions,
cultural and political institutions and ideologies, and so on.""1 In the binary
opposition definition of Mdtis as not Indian, it means that if the definition
of Indian changes, it may affect the definition of Mdtis.
When discussing Mdtis identity, biology (or ancestral connection as it
is described in Powley) can be particularly problematic because defining
identity based on biology leads to the creation of the notion of "half-
65. Powley, supra note 58 at para 30.
66. Andersen, Struggle for Peoplehood, supra note 2 at 9-10.
67. Ian Peach, "The Long, Slow Road to Recognizing Metis Rights: Metis Aboriginal Rights
Jurisprudence in Canada" in Adams, Dahl & Peach, supra note 2, 279 at 280.
68. Ibid at 281.
69. Ibidat281, 285.
70. Linda Alcoff, "Cultural Feminism versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist
Theory" in Nicholson, supra note 24, 330 at 349.
71. Ibid.
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breeds" and supports assumptions that "half-breeds" are half-civilized
based on the idea that biology is the vehicle to transmit culture 72 Biology-
based definitions support searches for "pure" bloods-who would be
the "real Indians"-and suggests that the watering down of the blood
diminishes government responsibility.3 Biological definitions based
on blood quantum are generally used to limit who qualifies, leading to
technical or statistical extermination to reduce government obligations.4
Eva Marie Garroutte warns against "embracing a definition of identity
that encourages the fiction of race"-that we can determine whether one
is Indian by looking at the amount of "Indian blood" in one's body. A
biological definition based on blood quantum creates artificial distinctions
of who qualifies and who does not.
After defining who the Mdtis are, the Court then considered the scope
of the rights at issue based on their understanding of these rights. Building
from Van derPeet, he Court defined Mdtis rights on a cultural basis. While
the scope of the rights is a separate issue from the definition of the Mdtis,
the scope of Mdtis rights is affected by the Court's understanding of who
Mdtis are, and thus is considered here. Jeremy Patzer criticizes the Court's
approach to defining Mdtis rights because the rights are grounded in
culture. He also criticizes the "cultural rights approach" currently used by
the courts, which focuses on identifying "authentic" Aboriginal practices
and "mobilizes a cunning politics of difference in which claimants are
apt to be cast as too distant from their own Aboriginality to merit the
recognition of their rights." 6 Patzer argues that Aboriginal (including
Mdtis) rights are political, not cultural rights.7 In order for such a shift
to happen, people must be defined as people, not using an understanding
based on race, biology, or culture. Grounding identity in culture freezes
that culture as one searches for the authentic Mdtis culture.
Yet the scope of the right has an impact on the Court's understanding
of the people. The relationship between the definition of the people and
the definition of the right is seen in the legal test for Aboriginal rights. The
Court protects cultural rights because of the understanding that Aboriginal
people are cultural groups, not political peoples.
72. Eva Marie Garroutte, Real Indians: Identity and the Survival of Native America (Berkeley:




76. Jeremy Patzer, "Even When We're Winning, Are We Losing? Metis Rights in Canadian Courts"
in Adams, Dahl & Peach, supra note 2, 307 at 309.
77. Ibidat 316.
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Using a cultural approach to defining Mdtis and Indian rights is
problematic because it freezes the cultures in the past:
By placing Aboriginal identifiers in the historical past rather than the
present or recent past, the Court denies that Aboriginal people act in the
world. They merely were rather than are. Aboriginal people are denied
the luxury of adaptation and change that the oppressor society takes
for granted .... Aboriginal peoples and cultures of the historical past are
speculated upon, defined, and judged in contemplation of the present.78
Defining rights through a cultural approach freezes the understanding of
who Mdtis people are. Defining Mdtis people requires a look back in time.
Grounding rights and legal definitions in culture fails to recognize that
Aboriginal people are people. Under the cultural definitional approach,
Mdtis are no longer self-determining and evolving people, but are reducible
to quintessential notions of Mdtis culture.
When looking at definitions of Mdtis, the cultural identification often
has people looking back to the 1800s when the mdtissage occurred, and
grounding definitions in this timeframe when a "distinct Mdtis culture"
emerged. Grounding legal definitions in culture freezes cultures at an
arbitrary time.79 The current definition of Mdtis requires a "look back"
to when Mdtis culture became distinct from Indian. Definitions based on
culture may be grounded in stereotypes" or may "impose a misleading
and timeless homogeneity."81 Grounding identity in culture "eventually
undermines a group's collective growth and vitality."
8 2
A cultural definition also opens up Mdtis culture to be judged by non-
Mdtis to determine authenticity.83 Moreover, basing identity on culture
ignores the impacts of the colonial agenda which set out to destroy
Indigenous cultures, thereby increasing feelings of shame and isolation
for those group members who may not speak their ancestral language(s)
or practice certain cultural activities.84 The dichotomous approach also
confirms, and potentially legitimizes, colonially-imposed definitions
because if the definition is connected to culture, then if one became
disconnected from their culture due to colonial interference, one may no
longer be recognized as Mdtis. Garroutte concludes "[t]his is not to say
78. D'Arcy Vermette, "Colonialism and the Process of Defining Aboriginal People" (2008) 31:1 Dal
LJ 211 at 244 [emphasis in original].
79. Palmater, supra note 7 at 193.
80. Garroutte, supra note 72 at 66.
81. Ibidat67.
82. Ibid at 78.
83. Ibid at 70, 78.
84. Ibid at 78-79.
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that Indian communities should abandon culture as a standard of identity.
But perhaps they would do well to remember their histories-and their
futures-as they think about how they use culture to define the boundaries
of their communities in the present."85
In Powley, the Supreme Court emphasized that the purpose of
protecting Mdtis rights under section 35(1) was to protect Mdtis distinct
culture. By emphasizing Mdtis distinct culture, the Court extends the
dichotomous approach to defining Mdtis rights in contrast to Indian:
"[t]he inclusion ofthe Mdtis in s. 35 is based on a commitment to recognizing
the Mdtis and enhancing their survival as distinctive communities.'86 This
dichotomous approach also means that individuals can only be Mdtis or
Indian-it assumes that Indian culture opposes or is adverse to Mdtis
culture.
Part of the Court's motivation for the dichotomy of either Indian
or Mdtis is to protect Mdtis culture from being taken over by Indian
culture.87 This concern further suggests that the legal definition of Mdtis
is grounded, in part, in a cultural approach. Cultural definitions of identity
are problematic in part because they are "conceptually fuzzy."8 Basing
identity in culture leads to questions about how distinct the culture must
be to be recognized as distinct.9 In the case of Mdtis people, it may also
lead to questions of how distinct Mdtis culture must be from Indian culture
to be recognized. Any perceived cultural overlaps can then be used to
undermine Mdtis distinctiveness.
R v. Blais was delivered contemporaneously with Powley.9 ° In Blais,
the Court was asked whether Mdtis had rights to hunt under the Natural
Resource Transfer Agreements (NRTA) which recognized the right of
Indians to continue hunting. The Court began its decision by indicating
"Mr. Blais is a 'Mdtis', a member of a distinctive community descended
from unions between Europeans and Indians or Inuit."91 In reaching
their decision that Mdtis were not Indians for the purpose of the hunting
rights recognized in the NRTA, the Court cited the definition of Mdtis in
Powley.92 Here, the dichotomous definition of Indian and Mdtis inhibited
the Court's ability to interpret a 1930s provision using the term "Indian"
to include Mdtis. The Court relied on the legal categories it created, which
85. Ibid at 81.
86. Powley, supra note 58 at para 13.
87. This was most explicitly articulated in Cunningham, supra note 5 at para 35.
88. Garroutte, supra note 72 at 63.
89. Ibid
90. R v Blais, 2003 SCC 44 at para 1, [2003] 2 SCR 236 [Blais].
91. Ibid at para 7.
92. Ibid at para 9.
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place Mtis in opposition to Indian, in order to legitimize limiting the
recognition of Mtis rights. In this case, it seemed obvious to the Court
that Mtis would not have hunting rights recognized under the NRTA
because Mtis and Indians are distinct and always have been recognized
and treated differently. Here, the Court relied on the mistaken assumption
that Mtis have always been treated differently in law to legitimize the
impossibility of being recognized as Mtis and Indian. As discussed above,
the historical regulation of the Mtis was more fluid and complex than the
simple Mtis or Indian dichotomy.
The Court in Cunningham reiterated the understanding of Mtis
identity evolving from Indian and European into a new people, distinct
from Indian:
The Mtis were originally the descendants of eighteenth-century unions
between European men-explorers, fur traders and pioneers-and
Indian women, mainly on the Canadian plains, which now form part
of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta. Within a few generations the
descendants of these unions developed a culture distinct from their
European and Indian forebears.93
To reiterate the critiques raised above, a definition of Mtis which
emphasizes the distinction (and evolution) from Indian was used to
support the Court's conclusion that the MSA provisions prohibited one
from being a Mtis settlement member and a status Indian concurrently.
94
In fact, the Court held that the restriction was an ameliorative program
(and therefore it was not contrary to the Charter's equality guarantees)-
that the membership requirement limiting Mtis settlement members from
also being registered Indians under the Indian Act was necessary in order
to preserve the Mtis peoples' distinctive identity.95 Here we see the Court
placing Mtis and Indian culture in opposition to one another, seeing dual
membership as a conflict.
In all these decisions, the Court ties Mtis identity to Indian identity.
This dichotomy of Indian and Mtis identity leads to the impossibility of
legally holding membership or citizenship in both categories. Cunningham
demonstrates the problem with the oppositional approach to defining Mtis
because when the legal definition of "Indian" changed under the Indian Act
(as occurred with Bill C-3 1) and when people modify their legal identity,
the courts assume that this will negatively affect Mtis cultural identity.
As the Canadian government continues to dictate "Indian" (at least under
93. Cunningham, supra note 5 at para 5.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid.
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the terms of the Indian Act), "Mtis" also becomes dependent upon the
Canadian government. A dichotomous definition of Indian and Mdtis thus
perpetuates colonial power and weakens Mdtis peoples' self-determination,
including the rights to self-definition and self-identification.96
The Court's decisions in these cases emphasize the distinction
between Mdtis and Indians and assume that there has always been a
clear distinction between the regulation of Mdtis and Indian. This issue
has come to a head again in Canada (Indian Affairs) v Daniels, where
the Supreme Court is considering whether Mdtis are Indians under
section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, ]867.9' In answering this question
initially, Justice Phelan of the Federal Court defined Mdtis as "a group of
native people who maintained a strong affinity for their Indian heritage
without possessing Indian status. Their 'Indianness' was based on self-
identification and group recognition."98 The Federal Court of Appeal
clarified this definition: "by using the phrase 'Indian heritage' the Judge
meant to refer to indigenousness or Aboriginal heritage; broader concepts
than First Nations heritage."99 The definitional approach that emphasizes
the distinction between Mdtis and Indian has now made it difficult to find
that Mdtis are under federal jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands reserved
for the Indians."1' Hence, the Federal Court's challenge was to formulate
a definition of "Mtis" that moves beyond the Mdtis/Indian dichotomy.
Since leave to appeal has been granted, the question remains whether the
Supreme Court of Canada will be able to overcome this conceptual hurdle
that plagued them in Blais.
This section has demonstrated the problems with judicial definitions
of Mdtis which have emphasized a dichotomy between Indian and Mdtis.
These problems include: the impacts that changing the legal definition
of Indian has on the definition of Mdtis; the inability to simultaneously
hold both Indian and Mdtis legal status regardless of one's political or
cultural connections; the implicit connection of identity to biology; and
grounding legal definitions in culture, which leads to searching for an
authentic culture frozen at a certain point in time. This section has also
96. Alcoff, supra note 70 at 338, writing about Foucault's critique of constructions of oppositional
subjects.
97. Canada (Indian Affairs) v Daniels, 2014 FCA 101, 371 DLR (4th) 725 [Daniels, FCA], leave to
appeal to SCC granted, [2014] 3 SCR vi.
98. Daniels v Canada, 2013 FC 6 atpara 117, 357 DLR (4th) 47. Atpara 130, Phelan J held "it is
those persons described in paragraph 117 who are the Metis for purposes of the declaration which the
Plaintiffs seek."
99. Daniels, FCA, supra note 97 at para 91.
100. Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 91(24), reprinted inRSC 1985, Appendix II,
No 5.
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demonstrated the problems with relying singularly on culture or biology
to determine identity. To address the shortcomings of the biological and
cultural approaches, a more robust and flexible approach, grounded in
recognizing the peoplehood of Mtis, is necessary.
Given the problems that have arisen with the Canadian legislative and
judicial definitions of Mtis, a solution which recognizes Mtis peoplehood
suggests that Mtis self-definition is the answer. However, in order to fully
address the scope of the problem of dichotomous definitions of Mtis, it
is important to understand how Mtis organizations have internalized the
dichotomous approach. The next section describes the definitions of Mtis
used by Mtis organizations.
IV. Mtis organizations 'definitions ofMtis
Given the problematic approach with Canadian definitions of Mtis, one
might simply suggest that Mtis people should be self-defining. However,
Mtis organizations also struggle to define Mtis in a way that does not
invoke the Indian/Mdtis dichotomy. Mtis organizations invoke this
dichotomy as part of a strategy to push back against notions of Mtis
being derived from Indian and against the general lack of recognition
in law. This section provides an overview of the various definitions and
requirements for membership or citizenship in Mtis organizations. The
overview demonstrates the ways in which Mtis organizations follow
contemporary Canadian legal definitions which emphasize the distinction
between Indian and Mtis: a continuation of the definition of Mtis as
not Indian. This brief description demonstrates the pervasiveness of the
dichotomous definition of Mtis before the final section reiterates claims
made by scholars that Mtis need to be recognized as people through
emphasizing internal qualities of who the Mtis are, not on external factors
of who the Mtis are not.
Mtis people created political alliances with non-status people in
the 1960s and 1970s.1" 1 These alliances were formed in part because of
the failure of First Nations organizations, largely representing Indian
Act reserve populations, to include Mtis and non-status people's issues
within their mandates. Both Mtis and non-status people were invisible
in Canadian law. The alliances between Mtis and non-status people
affected the definition of Mtis. Initially, the definition of Mtis was quite
broad, simply referring to mixed Indian and non-Indian, often welcoming
non-status Indians, in response to the negative impacts of limited Indian
101. Sawchuk, supra note 3 at 77.
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Act definitions of Indian."2 At that time, Mdtis people had virtually no
legally recognized rights; thus the organizations' definitions had little legal
consequence. However, after Mdtis rights were recognized by section 35,
the Mdtis National Council (MNC) formed, representing six provincial
affiliates: Mdtis Nation of Ontario, Mdtis Nation of Saskatchewan, Mdtis
Provincial Council of British Columbia, Manitoba Mdtis Federation,
and Mdtis Nation of Alberta."3 With Mdtis rights recognized by the
Constitution, "[a]ll of the prairie organizations subsequently changed their
definitions to either eliminate or at least no longer specifically recognize
non-Status Indians as potential members."' 4 Definitions of Mdtis now
emphasize a distinction between Mdtis and Indian, in part to compensate
for the overly broad definitions that were used out of necessity when
political alliances with non-status Indians were made. While the aim of
the dichotomous definition is to create a separate identity from Indians, the
approach keeps the two intimately connected and dependent. The use of
"Mdtis not Indian" reiterates that one cannot know who is Mdtis without
knowing who is Indian.
Today, the Mdtis National Council defines Mdtis as "a person who
self-identifies as Mdtis, is distinct from other Aboriginal peoples, is
of historic Mdtis Nation Ancestry and who is accepted by the Mdtis
Nation."" '5 While this definition uses the term Mdtis Nation, making the
definition of Mdtis contingent on the definition of Indian weakens the push
for recognition of a distinct Mdtis Nation. That is, even the Mdtis National
Council emphasizes the distinction from other Aboriginal peoples (Indian
and Inuit). Mdtis organizations also continue to emphasize the distinction
from Indians to differentiate themselves from other mixed Indian and
European people who do not share their common culture and language.
Larry Chartrand notes that "[m]any non-status Indians, who are ethnically
and culturally Indian, have for one reason or another, joined the Mdtis
associations of various provinces."'"16 Part of the motivation behind these
definitions, which emphasize a distinction from Indian, is to remove people
who joined Mdtis organizations when they lost Indian status. In trying to
distinguish Mdtis from Indian, Mdtis organizations have in fact reiterated
the interconnection between them.
102. Ibid.
103. Larry Chartrand, "Metis Identity and Citizenship" (2001) 12 Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues 5 at
14 [L Chartrand, "Identity & Citizenship"].
104. Sawchuk, supra note 3 at 78.
105. Metis National Council, "Citizenship," online: MNC <www.metisnatior.ca/index.php/who-are-
the-metis/citizenship>.
106. L Chartrand, "Identity & Citizenship," supra note 103 at 48.
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The dichotomous approach is not seen only at the national level-it
infiltrates the provincial level as well. All the INC-affiliated organizations
draw on the same dichotomy, which demonstrates the pervasiveness of
this approach. The definition of Mdtis in the constitutions of the Manitoba
Mdtis Federation and the Mdtis Nation of Saskatchewan elaborate on the
MNC definition, emphasizing the distinction of Mdtis people from other
Aboriginal people, namely Indians:
a. "Mtis" means a person who self-identifies as Mtis, is of historic
Mtis Nation Ancestry, is distinct from other Aboriginal Peoples and
is accepted by the Mtis Nation;
b. "Historic Mtis Nation" means the Aboriginal people then known
as Mtis or Half-Breeds who resided in the Historic Mtis Nation
Homeland;
c. "Historic Mtis Nation Homeland" means the area of land in west
central North America used and occupied as the traditional territory
of the Mtis or Half-Breeds as they were then known;
d. "Mtis Nation" means the Aboriginal people descended from the
Historic Mtis Nation, which is now comprised of all Mtis Nation
citizens and is one of the "aboriginal peoples of Canada" within s.35
of the Constitution Act of 1982;
e. "Distinct from other Aboriginal Peoples" means distinct for cultural
and nationhood purposes.0
A positive aspect of the definition is the requirement (stemming from
Pow ley) that individuals self-identify as Mdtis and be accepted by the Mdtis
community, as these requirements emphasize the political dimension of
Mdtis people. This definition also emphasizes that Mdtis people are those
people who connect to the Mdtis nation, who share a specific history and
culture.
However, by grounding the definition of Mdtis in the unique Mdtis
culture, these definitions also attempt to differentiate Mdtis from many
groups who have begun to use the term "Mdtis" to describe themselves
after section 35(2) recognized the rights of Mdtis people."8 These groups
often are not connected to historic Mdtis communities that arose in the
107. Manitoba Metis Federation, "Constitution," (Manitoba: Manitoba Metis Federation, 29
September 2013), art 3(1), online: Manitoba Metis Federation <www.mmf.mb.ca/docs/constitution
rev20l3 3.pdf>. See also Metis Nation-Saskatchewan, "Constitution", (Saskatchewan: Metis Nation-
Saskatchewan, 9 September 2008), art 10(1)(e), online: Metis Nation-Saskatchewan <www.mn-s.ca/
ckfinder/userfiles/files/Constitution o20of%/ 20the /o20M /oC3 /oA9tis o2ONation-Saskatchewan.pdf>.
108. One potential example would be the Eastern Woodland Metis Nation Nova Scotia, online:
EWMNNS <easternwoodlandmetisnationca/main.htm>
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1800s around the Northwest where M~tis nationalism arose.1"9 These
groups have often resorted to the label M~tis because they do not fit the
definition of Indian, but still want to assert Aboriginal rights under section
35(1). Thus, the definitions of the MNC-affiliated organizations may be an
attempt to differentiate "Mtis" from others who invoke the term based on
mere mixed blood.1 0
The M~tis Nation of Alberta is still working toward a Constitution
and currently they rely on the legal definitions of M~tis (found in Powley),
which again grounds M~tis identity in contrast to Indian.111 The M~tis
Nation of Ontario reiterates that M~tis are notjust "half-Indian" or "mixed-
bloods":
The Mtis are a distinct Aboriginal people with a unique histoiy, culture,
language and territory .... The Mtis Nation is comprised of descendants
of people born of relations between Indian women and European men.
The initial offspring of these unions were of mixed ancestry. The genesis
of a new Aboriginal people called the Mtis resulted from the subsequent
intermarriage of these mixed ancestry individuals."
2
These definitions repeat he narrative that M6tis are more than a mix of
European and Indian and that M6tis developed their own unique culture.
These various definitions of Mtis attempt to move past the biological
approach of Mtis as "half-Indian" or "mixed-bloods," but still ground
Mtis definitions in cultural opposition to Indians. By defining M6tis
in contrast to Indian, M6tis and Indian remain connected. So, rather
than distancing and separating M6tis culture from Indian culture, the
dichotomous approach to defining M6tis connects the two.
The concern with these definitions is the way in which M6tis
organizations self-define by invoking the dichotomy of Indian and Mtis.
Chris Andersen discusses the power, and what he calls the "symbolic
violence," of constitutional categories like Inuit, M6tis, and Indian that
are then internalized to become self-definitions.113 Jennifer S.H. Brown
likewise argues that many of the efforts to define M6tis, which rely
on the dichotomy of Indian and M6tis, focus on drawing boundaries
109. Jacqueline Peterson, "Many Roads to Red River: Metis Genesis in the Great Lakes Region
1680-1815" in Peterson & Brown, supra note 3, 37 at 37.
110. Chris Andersen, "Mixed Ancestry or Metis?" in Brendan Hokowhitu et al, eds, Indigenous
Identity and Resistance: Researching the Diversity of Knowledge (Dunedin, New Zealand: Otago
University Press, 2010) 23 at 24 [Andersen, "Mixed Ancestry or Metis?"].
111. Metis Nation of Alberta, "Who is Metis?," (Alberta: Metis Nation of Alberta), online: MNA
<www.albertametis.com/MetisRights/metisRights-WholsMetis.aspx>
112. Metis Nation of Ontario, "Registry," (Ontario: Metis Nation of Ontario), online: MNO <www.
metisnation.org/registry>.
113. Andersen "Mixed Ancestry or Metis?," supra note 110 at 24.
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"between them and others, and emphasize edges and exclusions rather
than centres.1 1 4 The reliance on the dichotomy again emphasizes who
Mtis are not, making the legal definition of Mtis contingent on Canada's
definition of Indian.
The definitions of Mtis used by Mtis political organizations attempt
to recognize Mtis as people, but still ground the definition in culture and
biology through the dichotomy with Indian. Indeed, Mtis have a unique
culture, separate from their Indian and European ancestors. However,
continued emphasis on Mtis culture in opposition to Indian culture limits
understanding Mtis as a people because the gaze is not turned inward.
A focus on the people emphasizes the individual's connection to a self-
determining political entity. Definitions of Mtis should not focus solely
on culture or biology, but should focus on protecting and realizing the
rights of people based on a political understanding of self-determining
Mdtis people.
V. Moving beyond the dichotomy: Defining M~tis people as people
Previous sections have explained various definitions of Mtis, including
those used by legislatures, courts and Mtis organizations. These definitions
rely on a dichotomy that limits individuals' abilities to be recognized as
simultaneously Indian and Mtis. When developing group definitions,
concerns exist regarding how and by whom the power of self-definition is
exercised. As seen in Cunningham, self-definition should not give Mtis
people unfettered discretionary power. Rather, definitional powers ought
to be exercised in accordance with international human rights standards,
such as those found in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples."5 This section describes the scope of Indigenous peoples' right to
define their own membership. It suggests that Mtis people should develop
definitions that emphasize Mtis are people (not merely races or cultures)
and these definitions should be developed in accordance with international
human rights standards.
Engaging in discussions around legal definitions of Mtis identity
requires moving from one's understanding of their own personal identity
toward a collective notion of identity, though one's personal identity is
connected to the group identity. Joyce Green describes personal identity as
dependent upon how one is positioned in a community through inclusion
or exclusion. 6 A legal self-definition would require individual Mtis
114. Brown, supra note 26 at 1.
115. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UNGAOR, 61st Sess, Supp
No 49, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (2007) [UN Declaration].
116. Green, "Indigenous Identity Formation," supra note 1 at 40.
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people to self-identify as Mtis. However, self-identification is not enough.
Collective identity, which is "derived from historical, cultural and political
experience," also must be addressed.117 Collective identity can then be
codified into citizenship requirements of the political entity (or people).
David Elkins defines citizenship as signifying "rights and privileges,
duties and responsibilities in a political community.., citizenship goes
beyond membership because it involves a sense of commitment, of being
engaged by the actions related to that community. It is a concept that takes
us beyond individualism, self-interest, and self-centredness, and thus it is
inherently related to concepts of community."1 8 As Mtis people continue
to redefine themselves, the political definition approach ought to be robust
and consider factors beyond mere biology or culture.
John Borrows has rejected ideas of Aboriginal citizenship being
grounded in blood quantum, explaining that "[s]cientifically, there is
nothing about blood or descent alone that makes an Aboriginal person
substantially different from any other person .... [E]xclusion from
citizenship on the basis of blood or ancestry can lead to racism and more
subtle forms of discrimination that destroy human dignity."1 9 A biological
definition "encourages... a dismissive attitude" toward Indigenous peoples
as peoples.2 ' The biological approach which considers blood quantum
(or ancestral connection) as the sole method of determining citizenship
dismisses the power of Indigenous peoples to determine their own
citizenship based on broader considerations. The Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples also specifically rejected the blood quantum and racial
identity approaches, and advocated for citizenship to be based on political
and cultural groups.2
A political approach to defining Mtis that moves beyond the
dichotomy of Indian and Mtis focuses on who Mtis are. As useful
starting points, Paul Chartrand and John Giokas's definition of Mtis
people emphasizes the "historic nation that had political relations with the
Crown." ' Chris Andersen provides an example of defining Mtis people,
117. Ibid at 37.
118. David Elkins, "Aboriginal Citizenship and Federalism: Exploring Non-Territorial Models"
(1994), Report prepared for the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples at 4-5, cited inL Chartrand,
"Identity & Citizenship," supra note 103 at 37 [emphasis in original].
119. John Borrows, "'Landed' Citizenship: Narratives of Aboriginal Political Participatiof' in Will
Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, Citizenship in Diverse Societies (New York: Oxford University Press,
2000) 326 at 339-340 [Borrows, "Aboriginal Political Participation"].
120. Garroutte, supra note 72 at 57.
121. Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: Restructuring the Relationship, vol 2
(Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1996) at 237-239.
122. Chartrand & Giokas, supra note 2 at 277.
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moving away from biological/cultural notions of mixedness, to focus on
the 'national core' historically located in Red River and in the shared
memories of the territory, leaders, events, and culture that sustain the
Mtis people today."'123 Andersen argues political definition is important
because it "demands political and policy conversations that position us as
political partners to be engaged with rather than as social problems to be
ameliorated.
124
A response to the problematic definitions of Mtis identity, and the
resulting definitions of membership or citizenship, is that Mtis people
themselves need the powerto determine their own identity and membership.
The UN Declaration clearly sets out this right.125 Pamela Palmater aptly
notes that simply moving from Canadian government definitions to self-
definition does not fully address the concerns outlined in previous sections,
as it does not resolve the questions of who is making these definitional
decisions and on what basis.126 Self-definition will not resolve the problem
of the way in which Indigenous peoples, including Mtis people, have
internalized biological and cultural approaches to definition "at the
cost of displacing their own models of citizenship."2 Therefore, self-
definition must be tempered through the various human rights protections
afforded to individuals by the UN Declaration. Additionally, Mtis people
need to re-centre "Mtis" in the definition of Mtis. In advocating for a
definition of Mtis without reference to Indian, this section provides some
consideration to guide self-definition to move beyond exclusive biological
or cultural approaches. However, this section does not present a new
definition of Mtis. Rather, the aim is to present alternative considerations
for Mtis political organizations to reconsider their definitions through a
process which engages people in looking internally to identify the factors
that make Mtis who they are today, and use those as the basis of their
definitions of Mtis.
The UN Declaration provides several points of guidance on the issue
of Mtis peoples' right to determine their own membership, in accordance
with international human rights standards. As a starting point, the UN
Declaration recognizes that Indigenous peoples have a right to self-
determination, including their political status,128 which must be exercised
123. Andersen, Struggle for Peoplehood, supra note 2 at 13.
124. Ibid at 19.
125. UN Declaration, supra note 115, art 33.
126. Palmater, supra note 7 at 176.
127. Val Napoleon, "Aboriginal Self Determination: Individual Self and Collective Selves" (2005)
29:2 Atlantis 31 at 35 [Napoleon, "Aboriginal Self Determinationf'].
128. UN Declaration, supra note 115, art 3.
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in accordance with international law.129 The right to self-determination
must be exercised in accordance with the other rights recognized in the
UN Declaration, including the rights to equality and non-discrimination.130
As part of self-determination and the right to determine political status,
"Indigenous peoples have the right to determine their own identity or
membership in accordance with their customs and traditions. This does
not impair the right of indigenous individuals to obtain citizenship of
the States in which they live." '131 Article 34 provides that "Indigenous
peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain their institutional
structures and their distinctive customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures,
practices and, in the cases where they exist, juridical systems or customs,
in accordance with international human rights standards."'132 Shin Imai and
Kate Buttery explain that "[t]here are three distinct matters covered in
[article 33]: the right to determine membership; the right to citizenship
in the state; and the right to decide the structure and membership in the
indigenous peoples' institutions."'133 While Indigenous peoples' have the
right to determine their own membership, these rights are not absolute-
they are bound by non-discrimination and gender equality provisions.
1 34
Holding Mtis people to these standards when they define themselves
provides a level of protection against arbitrary or discriminatory decisions
to refuse citizenship.
While Indigenous peoples have the right to determine their own
membership, Mtis peoples' self-definitions should define themselves as
a people, and move away from racial, biological, and cultural definitions.
Focusing on peoplehood moves beyond the problems with biological
and cultural definitions because "[a] people can grow and expand and
incorporate people from other nations and still have a connection to a
common history, ancestors, and traditional territories. "135
There is no set definition of "people" in international law, but an oft-
cited set of characteristics suggests that a people may have "some or all
of the following common features: (a) a common historical tradition; (b)
racial or ethnic identity; (c) cultural homogeneity; (d) linguistic unity; (e)
129. Ibid, preambulatory para 17.
130. Ibid, arts 1, 2.
131. Ibid, art 33(1).
132. Ibid, art 34.
133. Shin Imai & Kate Buttery, "Indigenous Belonging: A Commentary on Membership and
Identity in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples" (2013) Osgoode
Hall Law School of York University Working Paper No 49 at 9, online: Osgoode Digital Commons
<digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/allApapers/49>.
134. Ibid at 15.
135. Palmater, supra note 7 at 190.
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religious or ideological affinity; (f) territorial connection; (g) common
economic life." '136 The description continues to explain that "the group
must be of a certain number which need not be large (e.g. the people
of micro States) but which must be more than a mere association of
individuals within a State" and that "the group as a whole must have the
will to be identified as a people or the consciousness of being a people -
allowing that groups or some members of such groups, though sharing
the foregoing characteristics, may not have that will or consciousness."13'
While this description of people includes biological and cultural aspects,
the definition is broader and encompasses other considerations. Palmater
suggests that key features in defining a people-which is flexible and
reflects modem realities-would include demonstrating ancestral
connection; commitment to the nation; and commitment to the language,
culture, traditions, customs, and practices of the people.13 James Anaya
suggests that the term "people" includes various "associational and cultural
patterns actually found in the human experience."'139 These approaches
provide a more complex approach which moves beyond simple biological
connection or cultural practices as the basis for inclusion. Audra Simpson
identifies engaging in treaties, diplomacy, procedures and political
structures as indicia of Indigenous nations, or people.
141
As part of defining Mtis as a people, it may be helpful to consider
Garroutte's approach, which is grounded in kinship as found in Indigenous
peoples' own traditional values focusing on two aspects: relationship to
ancestry and responsibility to reciprocity.141 The first aspect highlights
the importance of genealogical relatedness to many Indigenous peoples,
and not identifying racial biological differences.14 ' The second aspect
emphasizes the importance of not just being a relative, but also acting
like one.143 In rejecting biological and cultural definitions of identity,
Garroutte advocates for considering identity: "individuals belong to those
communities because they carry the essential nature that binds them to The
People and because they are willing to behave in ways that the communities
136. Final Report and Recommendations: International Meeting of Experts on further study of the
concept of the rights ofpeoples, UNESCOR, 1990, UN Doc SHS-89/Conf.602/7 at 7-8.
137. Ibid at 8.
138. Palmater, supra note 7 at 200.
139. S James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (New York: Oxford University Press,
1996) at 78.
140. Audra Simpson, "Paths toward a Mohawk Nation: Narratives of Citizenship and Nationhood in
Kahnawake" in Duncan Ivison, Paul Patton & Will Sanders, eds, Political Theory and the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 113 at 116.
141. Garroutte, supra note 72 at 118.
142. Ibid at 127.
143. Ibid at 134.
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define as responsible."'144 This approach emphasizes the collective in
defining the people, while still honouring a person's connections to his
or her ancestors.45 It also provides for the continued commitment to
traditional values, and respects the individual-focused self-identification
insofar as it allows individuals to come to know and be accepted by the
group.146 This approach emphasizes connection (or political allegiance) to
a people beyond mere biological relations (ancestral or blood) or engaging
in cultural practices. These definitional approaches focus inward on the
people, defining who they are. Through this approach, the definition of
Mtis people would revolve around characteristics connected to Mtis
nationalism.
Borrows also argues for a kin-based approach grounded in the "social,
political, legal, economic, and spiritual ideologies and institutions that are
transmitted through their cultural systems."'147 This requires citizenship to
address "concerns about social stability, political unity and civil peace
148
which "expands citizenship from an individual level to a collective,
political level." 149 Mtis organizations will need to lead the work to develop
and elaborate on a definition of Metis that does not rely on the Indian!
Mtis dichotomy. However, some general comments can be made here.
Applying this approach to Mtis people would have Mtis people looking
inward to define themselves, not contingent on the definition of Indian. It
would "lodge Aboriginal identity within its source: that is, within ancestry,
history, location, and the abiding ties of loyalty and affinity that these
connections generate, since the source lends to Aboriginal community
identity a more permanent foundation.""15
In developing new definitions of Metis, Garroutte's approach
highlights a need for flexibility "because flexibility allows for the embrace
of those who truly belong to the community, even if they do not satisfy
certain technical criteria of membership."'51 Flexibility is also important
144. Ibid [emphasis in original].
145. Ibid at 135.
146. Ibid
147. Borrows, "Aboriginal Political Participation," supra note 119 at 340.
148. John Borrows, "Measuring a Work in Progress: Canada, Constitutionalism, Citizenship and
Aboriginal Peoples" in Ardith Walkem & Halie Bruce, eds, Box of Treasures or Empty Box? Twenty
Years of Section 35 (Penticton: Theytus Books, 2003), cited in Val Napoleon, "Aboriginal Discourse:
Gender, Identity, and Community" in Benjamin J Richardson, Shin Imai & Kent McNeil, eds,
Indigenous Peoples and the Law: Comparative and Critical Perspectives (Portland, OR: Hart, 2009)
233 at 252.
149. Napoleon, "Aboriginal Self Determination," supra note 127 at 39.
150. Tim Schouls, Shifting Boundaries: Aboriginal Identity, Pluralist Theory, and the Politics of Self-
Government (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003) at 120.
151. Garroutte, supra note 72 at 115.
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to recognize "the ongoing struggles faced by Indigenous peoples in
maintaining their cultures and traditions in the face of assimilatory
laws and policies." '152 In the case of Cunningham, flexibility would help
avoid the concern that acquiring status under the Indian Act undermines
the protection of Mdtis as a distinct culture. Instead, it would look at
the broader context influencing the decision and consider whether the
individual's allegiances have changed.
In addition to flexibility, a definition should be inclusive because as
Napoleon argues, "pre-contact aboriginal societies practised forms of
nationhood that were deliberately inclusive in order to build strong nations
with extensive international ties." '153 States have invoked biological
blood quantum approaches to defining "Indigenous" in order to reduce
their responsibilities, and so Indigenous peoples should exercise caution
when using similar approaches.15 4 In response to concerns about defining
Mdtis in opposition to Indian, which automatically limits one's ability
to be recognized as belonging to both groups simultaneously, Larry
Chartrand suggests that "the Mdtis Nation might want to consider that
such individuals [who have Indian status] are not automatically excluded
from citizenship but that they could lose citizenship if they do not maintain
a genuine connection to the Mdtis Nation." '55 This flexibility requires
considering broader factors and not simply relying on the biology- or
culture-based boundaries set by Canadian governments. It may allow one
to be recognized as both Indian and Mdtis, if doing so does not undermine
or threaten Mdtis people or nationhood. This process allows for a more
inclusive definition and centres Mdtis people. In defining a people, it
should not matter how much "Mdtis blood" one has, or if one still practices
a specific aspect of the culture; the focus should be on identifying the
underlying political, economic, social, and cultural values to guide the
definition. Such an approach may also allow for people whose family has
long identified as Mdtis because they have lost Indian status and have been
long connected with the Mdtis community to continue their membership,
provided they continue to pay allegiance to the Mdtis people. While this
may be a controversial suggestion, the point is to emphasize that moving
beyond biology to other factors may allow continued membership (or
citizenship) where certain criteria are met.
152. Palmater, supra note 7 at 201.
153. Napoleon, "Aboriginal Self Determination," supra note 127 at 38.
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Conclusion
The Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Cunningham, which confirmed
the membership provisions of the Mtis Settlements Act that prohibited
members from gaining status under the Indian Act as a necessary step to
protect Mtis culture, inspired this article to critically analyze the legal
boundary created between Indians and Mtis. This article demonstrated the
problems with current definitions of Mtis used by Canadian governments,
courts and Mtis organizations, all of which are based in a dichotomous
definition with Indian. The concerns that arise from a dichotomous
approach to Mtis identity are interconnected. Connecting Mtis identity
to Indian identity creates a hard line between Indian and Mtis, forcing
a person to be one or the other.156 Defining Mtis in relation to Indian
means that changing the definition of Indian also changes the definition
of Mtis. This is particularly problematic as Canada continues to change
the necessary blood quantum required to be an Indian, which can connect
definitions of Mtis to mix-bloodedness. Finally, defining Mtis as distinct
from Indian and emphasizing culture may limit the evolution of Mtis
culture and force a focus on identifying distinguishing features. If Mtis
identity continues to be connected through an oppositional definition with
Indian, it keeps the two intertwined and undercuts independent Mtis
nationhood.
Rather than basing definitions of Mtis, and the resultant membership
and citizenship definitions, on culture or biology, this article argues that
Mtis people need to be recognized as people. Definitions should be
flexible and consider multiple factors such as kinship connections and
broader commitment (or allegiance and loyalty) to the Mtis people.
With leave granted to appeal the Federal Court of Appeal's decision
in Daniels, the Supreme Court of Canada is again being asked to look at
the interconnection between Indian and Mt1tis. This decision provides an
opportunity for the court to look past the artificially constructed binary
between Indian and Mtis and realize that the historic regulation and
contemporary identity of these two groups is far more complicated than a
simple contrast.
156. Cunningham, supra note 5.
